I'm not sure it is correct to say "A body, the author agrees, is a composite of (substantial) form and prime matter." The unity of matter and form isn't a composite, but rather, well, a unity. Form doesn't inhere in matter, but is rather the dynamic process of ordering the matter. For instance, a statue isn't a composite of the form and the marble from which it is chiseled, nor would we suggest that the statue's form somehow inheres in the marble. Rather, we acknowledge that the statue itself is distinct from the mere marble -- the marble existed at one time when the statue did not! -- and so an account of what the statue is requires an understanding of the form the marble took, as well, of course, as the means by which it was formed, and the purpose for its formation -- we're all Aristotle's children here! (^:
I appreciate your concern that the persistence of the soul after death raises questions regarding the nature of the hylomorphic union, specifically regarding whether Thomas' position commits him to a substance dualism closer to Descartes than Aristotle. It's certainly something that requires a hearing. I just worry that framing a substance as a composite of matter and form strays too far from anything Thomas would have recognized as his own position.
Thanks for the comment. Aquinas and Co. are pretty clear on a body being a hylomorphic composite (see e.g., On being and essence, ch. 2). Also, 'being a composite' by itself is not incompatible with being (in some sense) a unity.
Regarding s. form's relation to matter, that s. form is, as you say, "the dynamic process of ordering matter" is something that it does i.e., to matter. But that by itself doesn't say anything about the question of whether or not s. form ontologically depends on matter. If it should turn out that it does, then the question is: how does it do so? Is it by inhering in matter or not? Whatever the case, the rest of the argument follows.
I'm not sure it is correct to say "A body, the author agrees, is a composite of (substantial) form and prime matter." The unity of matter and form isn't a composite, but rather, well, a unity. Form doesn't inhere in matter, but is rather the dynamic process of ordering the matter. For instance, a statue isn't a composite of the form and the marble from which it is chiseled, nor would we suggest that the statue's form somehow inheres in the marble. Rather, we acknowledge that the statue itself is distinct from the mere marble -- the marble existed at one time when the statue did not! -- and so an account of what the statue is requires an understanding of the form the marble took, as well, of course, as the means by which it was formed, and the purpose for its formation -- we're all Aristotle's children here! (^:
I appreciate your concern that the persistence of the soul after death raises questions regarding the nature of the hylomorphic union, specifically regarding whether Thomas' position commits him to a substance dualism closer to Descartes than Aristotle. It's certainly something that requires a hearing. I just worry that framing a substance as a composite of matter and form strays too far from anything Thomas would have recognized as his own position.
Thanks for the comment. Aquinas and Co. are pretty clear on a body being a hylomorphic composite (see e.g., On being and essence, ch. 2). Also, 'being a composite' by itself is not incompatible with being (in some sense) a unity.
Regarding s. form's relation to matter, that s. form is, as you say, "the dynamic process of ordering matter" is something that it does i.e., to matter. But that by itself doesn't say anything about the question of whether or not s. form ontologically depends on matter. If it should turn out that it does, then the question is: how does it do so? Is it by inhering in matter or not? Whatever the case, the rest of the argument follows.